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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the visitation demand function for Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) in 
order to determine the scope for raising fees charged to international tourists in order to fund 
revenue-sharing schemes for local communities. International and Southern African 
Development Community tourists account for approximately 25% and 2% of the total number 
of visitors to South African national parks, with domestic visitors making up the remaining 
portion. Though small, the South African international tourism market is mature, and accounts 
for a disproportionately large share (around 42%) of net revenue. To estimate visitation demand 
at the KTP and three other national parks, random effects Tobit Model was used. Using the 
estimated elasticities, the revenue-maximising daily conservation fee was computed to be 
R1 131.94 (US$144.20) for KTP, which can be compared with the R180 (US$22.93) currently 
charged. Furthermore, the study also demonstrated that there is a possibility of raising fees at 
the other three parks. Sharing conservation revenue with communities surrounding parks could 
demonstrate the link between ecotourism and local communities’ economic development, and 
promote a positive view of land restitution involving national parks. 
 
Keywords: benefit-sharing, conservation fee, demand, international visitors, land claim, 
national park. 
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1. Introduction 
South Africa has been experiencing a significant increase in international visitors for 
some time now, due in large part to the uniqueness and attractiveness of its 22 national parks, 
run by South African National Parks (SANParks).1 The top five markets for South African 
parks are Netherlands, Germany, France, United Kingdom and the United States making up 
the top five. According to SANParks (2016) this was achieved despite incremental increases 
in conservation fees2 over the years. South African residents account for approximately 73% 
of total number of visitors to national parks, with Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and international visitors making up 2% and 25% respectively. SADC visitation 
numbers are around 15% down compared to previous financial year, while international 
visitation is 2% higher compared to previous year.  
The South African international tourism market is mature, and accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of net revenue. According to J Stevens, the General Manager of 
Strategic Tourism Services at SANParks (personal communication, March 27, 2017), a 
breakdown of SANParks’ 2015/16 net revenue from conservation fees indicates that SADC 
and international tourists accounted for less than 1% and 42%, respectively. 
Conservation fees at national parks were imposed when the first national park, Kruger 
National Park, was proclaimed in 1926.3 The current SANParks pricing structure was 
introduced in 2003. Following the implementation of the revised pricing policy, conservation 
fees now vary among parks, and distinguish between South African residents, SADC residents, 
and residents of the rest of the world. One of the motivations for a nationality-based price 
strategy in favour of domestic nationals was that domestic residents contribute towards taxes 
from which SANParks receives state funding. Unlike in the past when fees were the same 
across the 22 national parks managed by SANParks, fees now vary more and variation in fees 
may be one of the criteria when tourists decide what parks to visit. Therefore, conservation fees 
may significantly influence decision on which park to visit, in addition to traditional drivers 
                                                 
 
1 SANParks is the overarching government agency responsible for national conservation in South Africa. 
2 The term conservation fee was officially adopted effective 2 April 2003 in place of admission/entrance fee 
because the former better describes the parks agency’s mission more appropriately (McKinsey & Company, 
2002). 
3 The records from Kruger show that the three cars that visited the park in 1927 were the first to be charged 
conservation fees, namely ₤1 each (equivalent to R2 each at the time). 
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such as park attributes, income and other demographics factors. The physical sizes of the 
national parks, the sizes of their workforces and the numbers of visitors who go there all have 
an effect on the cost of running them, hence the rationale for differences in their conservation 
fees. 
Notably, conservation fees are payable for any portion of a day spent inside a park – even 
though, for easier administration, for overnight visitors such fees are actually paid for every 
night spent inside it. Nonetheless, it is unclear what criteria are used to determine conservation 
fees; prices at South African national parks have been increased occasionally after 2003, but 
there seem to be few or no formal criteria for determining their levels. 
As part of South Africa’s land restitution programme, local communities have lodged 
successful land claims affecting six national parks. The government has taken the view that 
land claims must be resolved in the national interest by taking into consideration the intrinsic 
biodiversity value of the land, and seeking outcomes that will combine the objectives of 
restitution with conservation (Dikgang & Muchapondwa, 2012). The finalization of the 
Khomani San and Mier community land claim in May 2002 resulted in a drastic change in land 
ownership and land use choices in the Kgalagadi area. Local communities were awarded land 
and resource rights both inside and outside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier park (KTP). This 
marked a significant step forward in conservation in the Kgalagadi area as communities then 
became co-owners of international parklands. Therefore, in this and other cases affecting 
national parks, SANParks has been tasked with co-managing the transferred land on behalf of 
the local communities as contractual parks. Given that some local communities are now co-
owners of parks, they rightfully expect to share benefits with SANParks.  
At the core of the potential of sharing benefits with local communities is to realise the 
value of recreation in the parks. Because the parks agency is currently ploughing almost all 
conservation fees back into conservation (SANParks, 2010), it would need to generate 
additional revenue for any benefit-sharing to be possible. A 1 % levy on all hotel reservations, 
earmarked for community projects, was introduced effective from 1 November 2012 
(SANParks, 2013). However, this levy generates too little revenue to make a noticeable 
difference for the communities in question, and raising it to any noticeable extent would 
introduce the obvious risk of encouraging tourists to stay in hotels outside the parks so as to 
avoid the levy. Looking at the available options, we contemplate that the parks agency could 
generate more revenue by simply charging higher conservation fees to international visitors. 
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The argument here is that international tourists are willing to pay higher fees as they constitute 
a negligible fraction of their total costs and, unlike domestic tourists who partly subsidise parks 
through taxes, international tourist’s only finance parks through conservation fees. While 
higher conservation fees would presumably lead some potential tourists to travel to parks in 
other countries instead, the fact that the fees are a very small portion of overall costs of 
travelling to South Africa suggests that such substitution will be limited and that substitution 
between different parks within South Africa will be more important.  
In this spirit, the main objective of our research is to estimate the scope for increasing 
revenue from international visitors in order to fund benefit-sharing programmes at the KTP. 
These estimates are done with the help of the contingent behaviour (CB) methodology. The 
visitation demand functions will be estimated using experimental data generated from the CB 
survey conducted on visitors at KTP as well as Kruger, Augrabies Fall and Pilanesberg national 
parks (which were considered to be potential substitutes and/or complements for KTP). This is 
a valuation study, therefore: it asks international tourists who come to the park how they would 
respond to different hypothetical price levels.  
The management problems faced by the KTP, with restitution already in place, differ 
from those of the other three parks. However, the common challenge faced not only by the four 
parks in this study, but by national parks around the world, is that of shrinking budgets. Thus, 
the solution presented in this study of charging appropriate gate fees at recreational sites in 
particular could be a potential source that may be used to generate additional revenue by the 
park agencies to offset the dwindling tax-based government funding. This paper contributes to 
empirical work on optimal park pricing by expanding on the scant literature on determination 
of optimal park prices using experimental data. Given the restitution, the fundamental question 
is how the co-ownership can be managed efficiently.  
 
2. The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park 
For nature-based tourism in South Africa, there is a choice between national parks 
managed by SANParks with reasonable charges (low prices), nature reserves managed by 
provincial conservation agencies, and private game reserves which are often luxurious and 
offer exclusive game viewing and with somewhat higher prices. National parks, provincial 
nature reserves and private game reserves co-exist within the same broad system, and are to 
some extent substitutes. The fundamental difference is not in conservation but rather in the 
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tourist services they provide. This study’s general focus is on KTP specifically, and SANParks 
managed national parks more generally, for a variety of reasons: they manage the majority of 
protected areas and get the most visitors; they get government funding, hence have social 
responsibilities; and they are largely the ones affected by land claims.  
The KTP is located in the Kgalagadi District on the south-western border of Botswana 
and the Northern Cape border of South Africa. It can be accessed through five gates in three 
different countries, namely Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (SANParks, 2016). The park 
boasts an area of 3.8 million ha, making it one of the biggest conservation areas in the world 
(SANParks, 2006). The KTP is classified as a Category 2 park according to the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) classification of protected 
areas (IUCN, 1994; Sandwith et al., 2001). 
KTP only has two of the ‘big five’ large animals – desert lions and leopards. However, 
it is well known for its huge population of gemsbok and arid biodiversity. Kruger has all of 
these animals, has the biggest accommodation facilities, tarred roads and an international 
airport. The Kruger national park is the flagship of SANParks managed parks and by-far the 
largest park in South Africa. A visitor intercepted at Kruger is 1 500 km from KTP. The park 
has a wide variety of attractions comparable only with the best in Africa.  
The close proximity of Augrabies Falls national park to the KTP is the reason its 
visitation is also of interest in this study. The main attraction is the 56 metre high Augrabies 
Falls, considered to be one of the most impressive falls in South Africa. SANParks managed 
parks offer a variety of lodging types, ranging from camping, huts, safari tents, bungalows, 
cottages, and guest houses to luxury lodges.  
Although Pilanesberg Game Reserve is managed by the North West Parks and Tourism 
Board (NWPTB), it is of interest in this study given its popularity, status, similarity and 
location. We will refer to it as Pilanesberg National Park. The park is located in the crater of a 
long extinct volcano, and is the fourth biggest park in South Africa. It is also home to the ‘big 
five’, has world class accommodation, tarred roads and an airport nearby. The visitor usually 
sees all the parks in a few years’ time. 
The KTP encompasses part of the ancestral site of the Khomani San community. 
Following a successful land claim, this community and the adjacent Mier community were 
awarded land both inside and outside the KTP in May 2002. Since SANParks co-manages the 
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transferred land inside the park on behalf of the two communities, it is expected to do so in a 
way that generates revenue for the communities as well.4 
The household income for the Khomani San is very low, while unemployment is high. 
They have not really benefitted from the land restitution (Dikgang & Muchapondwa, 2016), 
and are heavily dependent on natural resources (Dikgang & Muchapondwa, 2012). Therefore, 
conservation in the area may be threatened by the overexploitation of natural resources. To 
discourage this over-reliance, the parks agency urgently needs to generate benefits from 
tourism to share with the community. Furthermore, appropriate park pricing takes into account 
the correct economic value of park visitation because conservation fees are a proxy of the 
valuation placed on recreation by park visitors (Lee & Han, 2002).  
In the literature on park fees, optimal fee setting, referring to the maximisation of revenue 
– or, ideally, profit – is seen as a goal for fees charged to international tourists, but not usually 
those charged to their domestic counterparts. This Optimal fee setting also seems appropriate 
from the perspective of financing benefit-sharing programmes. Given that the Khomani San 
are generally poorer than visitors to the park, increasing fees for domestic visitors may be 
desirable, but this could have distributional implications within the country and would 
complicate matters. Increasing fees for foreign visitors, on the other hand, has no problematic 
distributional impacts within the country as long as such higher fees lead to more funds 
becoming available to SANParks and the targeted community. This study therefore sought to 
estimate what fee level would maximise the revenue from international visitors so as to 
maximise the funds that could be used for benefit-sharing with local communities. 
 
3. Related literature 
There is an extensive literature on park user fees. The literature covers issues such as optimal 
pricing and revenue-maximising pricing via the Contingent Valuation and Travel Cost 
Methods, among others (see Buckley, 2003; Hughes & Carlsen, 2011; Subadea and Franciscob, 
2014; Pandita, Dhakalb and Polyakovc, 2015; Voltaire, 2017). Although many studies have 
                                                 
 
4 The discussion from here on deals only with the Khomani San community, who San are more dependent on 
natural resources in the park and broader area, and who interact more directly with nature. They manage their land 
restitution and resource use affairs communally in line with their tradition. The local municipality manages the 
affairs of the Mier community. 
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been undertaken on visitors’ preferences for national parks, most have focused on estimating 
visitors’ willingness to pay for the recreational experience in an attempt to measure the value 
assigned to national parks. 
Most of the studies conducted on setting park fees reveal that the actual conservation fees 
currently being charged to park visitors are significantly below what such visitors are willing 
to pay; moreover, the fees are below what is required to cover operational costs (see e.g. Ågren 
et al., 2003; Andersson et al., 2005; Lal et al. 2017; Naidoo & Adamowicz, 2005). In particular, 
studies undertaken in developing countries reveal that the entrance fee charged in national 
parks is often substantially lower than what visitors are prepared to pay (Dixon & Sherman, 
1991; Bird, 1992; Whitelaw et al., 2014; Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2016). This implies that 
most parks visits are under-priced. Such a perverse outcome suggests that relatively poor 
countries are subsidising the visits of people from developed nations, who make up the majority 
of visitors at national parks in most developing countries. 
However, in order to determine the revenue-maximising conservation fees to be charged 
at any specific national park, one needs to know the visitor’s preference for visiting that park 
or any other substitute or complementary parks. This information can be extracted from the 
visitation demand functions of national parks. Visitation demand functions can be estimated 
based on historical or experimental data. 
To the best of our knowledge, only the study by Alpízar (2006) used historical data to 
compute optimal entrance fees – in his case, for national parks in Costa Rica. Similarly, very 
few studies have attempted to estimate revenue-maximising conservation fees using 
experimental data (for studies that do so, see e.g. Chase et al., 1998; Naidoo & Adamowicz, 
2005). 
A growing number of studies in recreational demand models use the Contingent 
Behaviour Method (CBM) in order to predict quantities under hypothetical scenarios (Grijalva 
et al., 2002). The CBM asks those who come to the park what they would do under hypothetical 
circumstances (with varying prices). The technique makes it possible to generate variation in 
conservation fees by asking respondents – park visitors in this case – how they would vary their 
visitation rates (e.g. the number of days spent visiting a specific park in a year) if the 
conservation fees were to be increased by any specified amount at that or any other park. 
Chase et al. (1998) used the CBM to investigate the revenue-maximising entrance fees 
for Costa Rican national parks. Using a similar approach, a study by Naidoo and Adamowicz 
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(2005) simulated fee increases and estimated entrance fees that maximised tourism revenue to 
the Mabira Forest Reserve in Uganda. The determination of revenue-maximising fees using 
experimental data adds value to research on park pricing as it can be designed to mimic the real 
market. Furthermore, introducing substitutes embraces micro theory in a richer fashion. 
Compared with imposing a single conservation fee, price discrimination not only has the 
potential of increasing revenue, but also satisfies equity issues from a social point of view and 
brings about local community stability. Price discrimination among users can enable resource 
use in different sites, among different time periods, and among different user profiles (South 
African residents and international tourists). 
These differences are reflected in the differences in individual visitors’ visitation demand 
functions and price elasticities of demand. Own- and cross-price elasticities are critical 
components of a national parks’ pricing policy. Thus, revenue-maximising park pricing is 
dependent on the reliability of the demand elasticities (Chase et al., 1998). The parks agency 
is able to engage in price discrimination because the market can be segmented relatively easily, 
which enables visitors with varying elasticities of demand to be identified and treated 
differently. 
Estimating how high to make the KTP’s conservation fees is important as it may 
contribute toward developing effective pricing strategies in the context of South Africa’s 
national park system. This study is critical, therefore, as it suggests ways to set conservation 
fees at revenue-maximising levels for the benefit of local communities surrounding parks, who 
often incur the highest cost of conservation and yet experience the least of its benefits (Mendes, 
2003). In contrast, international tourists do not incur the cost of conservation and yet experience 
the most benefits; hence, it is vital that they are charged revenue-maximising fees. 
 
4. The Contingent Behaviour Method 
For the purposes of this study, the CBM is considered the most appropriate due to its ability to 
consider substitution effects when generating experimental data for estimating visitation 
demand functions. This paper adopts the CBM formulation by Chase et al. (1998) to estimate 
what revenue-maximising conservation fees could be charged to international visitors to the 
KTP and to three other South African parks. 
In a CBM setting, the park visitor is assumed to maximise a utility function u = U(X, Q), 
subject to the budget constraint ௑ܲX +	 ொܲQ = M, where X is a vector of private goods, Q 
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represents the recreational goods (i.e. visits5 to South African parks), ௑ܲ is a vector of market 
prices of private goods, ܲ ொ is the vector of virtual prices of recreational goods (i.e. conservation 
fees), and M is the individual’s disposable income (see e.g. Freeman, 1993). Solving the 
maximisation problem gives a set of Marshallian demand functions, and the aggregation of 
these demand functions yields a market demand function for Q: Q = Q(M,	 ௑ܲ,	 ொܲ). The 
symmetrical demand functions for each of the – in this case, four – parks can be written as: 
 
ܳ௜ 	ൌ 	ƒሺ ଵܲ, 	 ଶܲ	, ଷܲ	, ସܲ	; ܯ; ܼሻ, (1) 
 
where ܳ௜ is the park visitation rate (e.g. days per year) by international tourists at park i; 
௜ܲ is the conservation fee at park i; ܯ is the tourist’s disposable income; and ܼ captures the 
socio-economic and trip-related characteristics (Chase et al., 1998).6 The visitation demand 
functions for the parks will be estimated using experimental data generated from the contingent 
behaviour survey conducted on visitors at the KTP as well as the Kruger, Augrabies Falls and 
Pilanesberg National Parks, which were considered as substitutes for or complements to the 
KTP. 
Table 1 shows an example of the charts used by the authors to capture data regarding 
visitors’ responses to actual and hypothetical own- and cross-price scenarios at the parks 
concerned. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The respondents were shown the chart with a blank piece of paper covering all but the 
first block of three columns. The respondents were asked, “During your current trip, for how 
many days will you visit the KTP at the current daily entrance fee of R1807 (US$22.93) per 
person per day?” The question was repeated for the Kruger, Augrabies Falls and Pilanesberg 
                                                 
 
5 Number of total visits to the park for the past five years. 
6 The demand function represented by equation (1) assumes that individuals allocate their disposable income 
between recreational goods and a composite commodity with a numeraire price. 
7 US$ 1 = South African Rand (R) 7.85 at the time the paper was written. The payments are in 2011 values. 
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National Parks. The 20168 daily conservation fee for the KTP was R280 (US$18.05). With 
favourable exchange rates for many international currencies, South Africa has become an 
inexpensive destination as park conservation fees are quoted in Rands. 
After the participant had specified the number of days s/he had spent in each park in the 
relevant column provided, the interviewer explained that a set of hypothetical questions would 
follow in which the fee would be raised at only one park. The first hypothetical question raised 
the entrance fee at the KTP only. The interviewer therefore asked the following: “If the fee 
were increased to wj Rands only at the KTP, how would that affect your plans to visit the KTP 
and the other parks (Kruger, Augrabies Falls and Pilanesberg)?” The second to fourth 
hypothetical questions analogously raised the entrance fees at Kruger, Augrabies Falls and 
Pilanesberg, respectively. 
Even though each respondent answered visitation questions about five entrance fee plans 
(actual fee, hypothetical fee 1, hypothetical fee 2, hypothetical fee 3, hypothetical fee 4), the 
hypothetical price plans have to vary across respondents in order to generate sufficient 
variability for estimable demand functions. In other words, different groups of respondents had 
to answer hypothetical price plan questions about different fee levels. 
Both with the actual and the hypothetical fees, a number of respondents said that they 
had not visited or would not visit all parks. For several observations, then, the number of days 
spent in a park was 0; of course, there were no observations where the number of days spent 
was less than 0. Thus, care needs to be taken in the statistical analysis because the dependent 
variables – the number of days spent in each respective park – are truncated at 0. Because this 
meant ordinary linear regression methods would be unsuitable, we used a fixed-effects Tobit 
Model instead (see e.g. Greene, 2011, for a description of this estimation method). 
5. Descriptive statistics 
A face-to-face questionnaire survey was conducted with randomly selected park visitors 
at the four parks. Only one person per traveling group was interviewed. These respondents 
were either park-goers or those who had already paid to get to the park. The survey was 
conducted from Monday to Sunday during March and April 2011. Due to the vast size of the 
                                                 
 
8 The 2016 exchange rate, based on an average of the January to April monthly average, was US$1 = R15.51 at 
the time of writing; the Rand has depreciated sharply against most foreign currencies since the study was 
conducted. 
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four parks, the surveys were mainly carried out at the gates, at accommodation facilities, or at 
designated rest areas inside each park. At the different accommodation facilities, both camping 
and chalets were included. At the designated rest areas inside the parks, respondents were asked 
whether they were overnight or day visitors. Day visitors were excluded from the sample. 
Visitors who had already paid to get to the park were interviewed at the gates. Targeting 
different accommodations increased the response rate and the representativeness of the final 
sample.  
The survey canvassed a total of 463 overnight visitors, of whom 78 international 
overnight visitors whose responses were used for the analysis presented here.9 Owing to the 
experimental process utilised, the data gathered on park demand preferences resulted in a data 
set consisting of five observations for each of the 78 respondents for each park. Thus, for data 
analysis, we have 390 observations to work with for each park. Approximately 63 percent of 
our sample originates from the top five markets. The remainder is from other Western 
Countries with Australian tourists accounting for around 13 percent of the whole sample. Our 
sample composition is in line with the visitor profile at national parks in South Africa, where 
international visitors account for a relatively small share of total visits. Nonetheless, although 
our sample size for international tourists was small, given their significant revenue contribution 
they offer valuable lessons in respect of their elasticity of demand, price and time. 
 
 (Table 2 about here) 
 
On average, the respondents interviewed visited national parks about 1.67 times each. 
Our data show that the majority of international respondents (59.44%) were first-time tourists. 
The data also indicate that most international visitors to national parks did not make use of 
travel agency services, with the exception of visitors to Pilanesberg National Park. A slight 
majority – about 51.1% – of international visitors visited other recreational sites during their 
trips as well. 
                                                 
 
9 Although SANParks distinguishes between three categories of visitors, our sample only consists of domestic 
(i.e. South African) and international visitors. We did not get any respondents from the SADC region. This is 
expected since visits from SADC residents make up a very small proportion of total visits. Furthermore, South 
African national parks cater to both day and overnight visitors, and charge the same conservation fees for both 
categories. 
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It seems that park visitors feel strongly about the institution that manages the revenues 
with international visitors of the view that the park agency is well placed to manage this scheme 
better with raised fee mechanism being their favoured mechanism, with the exception of 
visitors to Kruger Park. On average, international visitors stayed at the parks for 4.22 nights 
each. Around 64% of the respondents were male and 36% were female. The findings also show 
that the average international visitor who enjoys national parks around South Africa is 
approximately 51 years old, and has an average household size of about 2.93. 
Furthermore, we carried out statistical two-tailed tests assuming unequal variances and a 
5 percent significance level to assess the magnitudes of the stated mean WTP preferences 
between the two hypothetical scenarios. We conclude from these tests that the difference 
between “raised fee” and “voluntary donation” WTP is statistically significant only for local 
visitors in Kruger and Augrabies. 
 
6. Empirical results 
The data gathered on park demand preferences resulted in a data set consisting of five 
observations for each of the 78 respondents. The estimates make use of a random effects Tobit 
regression with a log-linear model. Table 3 presents the results of this estimation to analyse 
factors10 that determine visitation demand by international tourists, based on the contingent-
behaviour-generated experimental data at the four parks concerned. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The relationship between price elasticity and total revenue is critical as it helps to inform 
managers when making pricing decisions for a good or service. When something like price 
changes in a market, elasticity tells us how other things will change. Price elasticity tells us 
how much of an impact a change in price will have on the park visitor’s willingness to visit the 
park. Economic theory predicts that there is an inverse relationship between price and quantity 
demanded, i.e. the law of demand states that the quantity demanded of the good or service 
                                                 
 
10 The survey included measures of attitudinal variables; however, since these did not add significant explanatory 
power, they are excluded from the results reported here. 
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decreases as its price increases. This is indeed the case in this study, as the own-price estimates 
at all four parks in question were negatively signed. However, the own-price estimates for 
Kruger and Augrabies Falls were not statistically significant. This suggests that park guests at 
Kgalagadi and Pilanesberg are more sensitive to changes in conservation fees. The negatively 
signed and significant Kgalagadi and Pilanesberg own-price elasticities imply that raising 
conservation fees at these parks would result in lower revenues generated by them, as tourists 
would visit either less frequently or not at all, ceteris paribus. 
Another finding is that the visitation demand at Kgalagadi is sensitive to fee changes in 
Kruger. The positive Kruger coefficient implies that it is a substitute and that increased fees at 
Kruger would increase the number of visitors to KTP. Interestingly, fee increases in the other 
two parks would have no impact on the revenue generated by the KTP. Our discussions 
demonstrate that price elasticity of demand and total revenue are closely interrelated. Thus, it 
is vital for managers to know whether their product or services have inelastic or elastic demand. 
It is equally vital to know about cross-price elasticity. Both own-price and cross-price elasticity 
estimates can be used to improve pricing strategies. 
It should be noted that, although we may seem to attempt to explain visitation demand 
with pricing alone, other factors are, of course, also at play – including the park’s proximity to 
the visitor’s country of origin, as well as the park’s branding, its image and its positioning in 
the tourism market. Many international guests seem to visit protected areas in other parts of the 
world quite regularly, and incur high travel costs in doing so. This in turn suggests they could 
tolerate significant price increases because of their desire to experience the unique African 
wilderness. Thus, international visitors are more likely to be willing to pay higher conservation 
fees in the presence of transparency, i.e. if they know how their fees are used, and why. In fact, 
visitors who used tour packages – where the pricing of individual components is far less 
transparent – were generally willing to pay less. 
Another critical issue is the inclusion of covariates because these can improve parameter 
estimation. With respect to income levels, for example, given that international visitors have 
already incurred high travel expenses, it is perhaps unsurprising that this variable did not 
influence visitation demand at any of the four parks in the study. A closer look at socio-
economic characteristics shows that the multi-trip variable is both negative and significant at 
Kgalagadi and Augrabies. The fact that the latter is the closest park to the former makes this 
result logical. The education coefficient is positive and significant only at the Kgalagadi. 
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Perhaps highly educated tourists are more aware of the fragile desert ecosystem in the KTP, 
and hence education influences demand for this particular park. Gender (male dummy) is 
negative and significant only at the KNP. The region that the tourist is from is also of no 
importance in terms of influencing visitation demand at any of the parks. Again, this perhaps 
comes as no surprise, given the popularity of South African national parks internationally. 
Using the elasticities estimated in the random effects Tobit Model, we solved for the 
revenue-maximising daily conservation fees reported in Table 4. We follow the same approach 
adopted by Dikgang and Muchapondwa (2016), namely of using the Marshallian theory of 
price elasticity of demand in determining the price-quantity points at which revenue is 
maximised. The standard result from economic theory is that the parks agency can maximise 
revenue by setting the conservation fee at a level where the park visitation demand has unitary 
elasticity. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
The results above indicate that the fees could be raised substantially at the four parks 
involved in the study.11 Our revenue-maximising fee estimates are significantly higher than the 
current fees charged to international visitors at these four parks. Given that the KTP had 
approximately 5 500 international visitors in 2011 (excluding the approximately 1 500 Wild 
Card12 guests who do not pay separately to the KTP), our proposed scheme would have raised 
R5.2 million (US$662 420.00) in 201113. This is significantly higher than the Khomani San 
community’s current total income. This amount is equivalent to US$335 267.57 in current-day 
(i.e. 2016) terms, which is still significantly more than the community’s current total income. 
Thus, even if international visitors respond to changes in the Rand price rather than the price 
                                                 
 
11 A point to note is that Pilanesberg charges a weekly rate; hence, our estimate reflects the revenue-maximising 
weekly fee. In the case of other parks, we estimate daily revenue-maximising conservation fees. 
12 Wild Card members pay an annual membership fee that entitles them to free entrance at any natural reserve 
under SANParks’ jurisdiction. 
13 You cannot simply take the difference in fees and multiply it by the total number of visitors as of course the 
number of visitors would drop albeit not massively if the fees were raised. If fees were implemented, it is 
estimated that the KTP visitation numbers would drop by 4 percent, which is very little. 
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in international currency, our proposed price scheme would still double the community’s 
income. 
Realistically, most international visitors respond to changes in the US Dollar price rather 
than the Rand price, in which case the revenue-maximising fee could be set even higher, and 
thus generate even more income for the community. If SANParks were to impose conservation 
fees denominated in hard currency such as the US Dollar on international tourists (as in 
Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe), then this scheme could generate even 
more park revenue. A hard-currency-denominated pricing strategy is of more benefit to 
developing countries, since hard currencies are relatively stable, i.e. their value does not change 
very much. In contrast, developing countries have soft currencies, suggesting that their value 
often trends downward. Therefore, with our proposed hard-currency-denominated 
conservation fees, one could expect that, when the value of developing countries’ currencies 
goes down (as the South African Rand’s often does), the revenue generated from international 
tourists would rise in domestic currency terms. 
A conversion of our estimates to US Dollars appears to yield reasonable conservation 
fees, comparable to those of similar recreational sites in Africa. For example, international 
visitors pay up to US$50 per night at some recreational sites in Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our findings imply that the conservation fees currently charged to international visitors are 
significantly lower than what is required to maximise revenues generated by the park. 
Interestingly, an overwhelming number of international visitors were not aware of conservation 
fees to the park: such costs are hidden in tour packages and in the prices of guide services. 
When asked what they thought the conservation fees were, most international tourists gave 
amounts higher than the current fees. This is further proof not only of the undervaluation of 
South Africa’s national parks, but also of international tourists’ willingness to pay more to visit 
them. 
Tourism is seasonal in most parts of the world. In the case of international visitors, it is 
driven, among other factors, by weather conditions in their home country and by their 
destination. Thus, future research should try to estimate revenue-maximising conservation fees 
taking tourism seasonality into account. 
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However, even if such seasonality is disregarded and fees continue to be kept constant 
throughout the year, our study indicates that there is substantial scope for increasing the 
benefits to South African society from international tourists visiting its national parks. If the 
fees at the KTP are raised to their revenue-maximising levels, and the extra proceeds are 
earmarked for benefit-sharing with the local Khomani San community, our results indicate that 
the community’s annual income would more than double as a result. Increasing fees at other 
South African parks and earmarking the proceeds in a similar fashion would presumably have 
similar impacts. This scheme has a potential to generate even more revenue for both beneficiary 
parties if SANParks were to start charging international tourists in foreign-denominated 
currencies such as the US Dollar. 
Given that international visitors are likely to be accustomed to contributing donations in 
their respective countries at recreational sites (such as museums), the introduction of voluntary 
donations has the potential to contribute significantly. Given that the park has well-established 
infrastructure to help communities extract more benefits for their participation in conservation, 
this study demonstrates that there is a possibility of generating more revenue from conservation 
fees for sharing with the new but poor co-owners of international parklands. If such 
opportunities exist, then the modes of making tourists pay more can vary, and may include for 
example the introduction of a levy on daily entrance fee to the national park, earmarked for 
community projects. The introduction of the 1% levy on all accommodation is a good practical 
example that shows that such mechanisms are feasible.  
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Table 1: Sample of the Contingent Behaviour Method chart used for international tourists 
Name of 
park 
Actual visit Hypothetical visits 
Fee 
(US$) 
No. of 
days 
Fee 
(US$) 
No. of 
days 
Fee 
(US$) 
No. of 
days 
Fee 
(US$) 
No. of 
days 
Fee 
(US$) 
No. of 
days 
Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier 
Park 
22.93  28.66  22.93  22.93  22.93  
Kruger 
National 
Park 
22.93  22.93  28.66  22.93  22.93  
Augrabies 
Falls 
National 
Park 
12.74  12.74  12.74  15.92  12.74  
Pilanesberg14 
National 
Park 
5.73  5.73  5.73  5.73  7.17  
NB: The payments are in 2011 values. Note that the South African Rand has lost approximately half its value 
against the US Dollar. Therefore, the 2016 current-day fees in US Dollars are nearly half those given in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
 
14 In addition to the gate fee shown above, Pilanesberg charges R20 (US$2.55 at the 2011 exchange rate) for each 
car that goes inside the reserve. 
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Table 2: A selection of descriptive statistics for international overnight visitors interviewed 
Variable Kgalagadi 
National Park 
Kruger 
National Park 
Augrabies Falls 
National Park 
Pilanesberg 
National Park 
N 19 32 21 6 
Visit frequency to parks 1.79 
(1.48) 
1.69 
(1.26) 
1.86 
(1.56) 
1.33 
(0.76) 
First visit 52.63% 
(50.20%) 
37.50% 
(48.56%) 
80.95% 
(39.46%) 
66.67% 
(47.95) 
Travel agent 26.32% 
(44.27%) 
21.88% 
(41.47%) 
47.62% 
(50.18%) 
0% 
(0%) 
Multi-trip 36.84% 
(48.49%) 
43.75% 
(49.76%) 
90.48% 
(29.50%)  
33.33% 
(47.95%) 
Household size 2.47 
(0.76) 
3.34 
(2.40) 
3.24 
(1.91) 
2.67 
(0.76) 
Actual fee paid R180.00 
(R0.00) 
R180.00 
(R0.00) 
R100.00 
(R0.00) 
R45.00 
(R0.00) 
Daily actual household/group fee 
(excluding annual wild card pass) 
R753.00 
(R768.90) 
R682.97 
(R667.82) 
R580.24 
(R802.49) 
R50.37 
(R32.52) 
Total fee expenses R1 718.95 
(R1 011.59) 
R2 331.25 
(R1 865.34) 
R804.05 
(R937.44) 
R196.67 
(R108.90) 
Fair fee R171.58 
(R80.84) 
R170.63 
(R75.60) 
R93.81 
(R26.76) 
R 80.83 
(R57.79) 
WTP Over and Above Actual Fee Paid:     
Raised Fee R88.16    (R112.51) R81.25    (R147.57) R45.24    
 (R44.28) 
R60     
(R97.63) 
Voluntary Donation R76.32    (R101.35) R89.84    (R153.68) R41.67     
(R46.73) 
R35     
(R34.61) 
No Visit Fee R286.32 
(R 121.61) 
R322.42 
(R153.44) 
R274.29 
(R159.12) 
R158.33 
(R77.11) 
Accommodation costs R1 726.05 
(R1 790.26) 
R4 835.78 
(R4 242.48) 
R2352.95 
(R2 279.30) 
R 2 774.33 
(R3 009.46) 
Total trip costs R17 404.00 
(R19 626.94) 
R21 780.00 
(R15 234.33) 
R11 885.24 
(R7 144.41) 
R 10 056.67 
(R9 738.09) 
Household annual income R281 578.90 
(R217 132.30) 
R325 312.50 
(R240 985.10) 
R197 142.90 
(R197 170.90) 
R282 500.00 
(R139 850.60) 
Actual number of nights 3.79 
(1.80) 
6.06 
(6.07) 
1.71 
(1.04) 
5.33 
(2.67) 
Number of nights respondent would have 
spent if there had been no fee   
4.79 
(2.85) 
6.88 
(7.27) 
1.95 
(1.53) 
6 
(1.86) 
Number of nights at increased fee  3.94 
(1.93) 
5.23 
(5.91) 
1.6 
(0.94) 
5.13 
(2.76) 
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Age (years) 49.42 
(12.12) 
48.03 
(16.68) 
52.62 
(15.62) 
54.33 
(14.61) 
Share of male respondents 68.42% 
(46.73%) 
56.25% 
(49.76%) 
47.62% 
(50.18%) 
83.33% 
(37.90%) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses  
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Table 3: Random effects Tobit Model results in respect of the demand for visits to parks by 
international visitors 
Variable Estimates: Coefficient 
Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier 
Park 
Kruger National 
Park 
Augrabies Falls 
National Park 
Pilanesberg 
National Park 
Price – Kgalagadi (R/night) -.568*** 
(.186) 
 -.332 
(.223) 
-.113 
(.141) 
-.155 
(.132) 
Price – Kruger (R/night) .711*** 
(.127) 
-.217 
(.152) 
-.636*** 
(.097) 
-.022 
(.091) 
Price – Augrabies (R/night) .218 
(.184) 
-1.566*** 
(.220) 
-.043 
(.140) 
.029 
(.130) 
Price – Pilanesberg (R/night) .235 
(.166) 
-.092 
(.199) 
-.123 
(.126) 
-.348*** 
(.118) 
Income (R) -.076 
(.089) 
.111 
(.096) 
.024 
(.095) 
.163 
(.162) 
Age (years) -.236 
(.330) 
-.023 
(.354) 
-.496 
(.352) 
-.670 
(.598) 
No. of household members on trip -.221 
(.187) 
-.111 
(.200) 
-.202 
(.199) 
.372 
(.339) 
Multi-trip -.716*** 
(.218) 
-.181 
(.234) 
-.871*** 
(.232) 
-.183 
(.395) 
Male dummy -.211 
(.202) 
-.435** 
(.217) 
-.113 
(.215) 
.042 
(.367) 
Education (years) .165** 
(.083) 
-.064 
(.089) 
.135 
(.088) 
.219 
(.150) 
Asia .335 
(.261) 
.175 
(.280) 
.171 
(.278) 
-.025 
(.474) 
The Americas -.182 
(.323) 
-.179 
(.347) 
-.271 
(.345) 
-.180 
(.587) 
Oceania -.110 
(.353) 
-.612 
(.379) 
.1304 
(.376) 
-.261 
(.639) 
Constant .204 
(3.054) 
12.110*** 
(3.508) 
6.35** 
(2.717) 
1.819 
(3.820) 
Log-likelihood -506.555 -569.557 -424.955 -443.914 
Wald chi2(10) 84.85 68.58 71.19 25.13 
No. of observations 390 390 390 390 
Source: Field survey, 2011 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 4: Various conservation fee options for international park visitors in 2011 South African 
Rand (R) and 2011 US Dollars (US$), unless otherwise specified 
 Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier 
Park 
Kruger 
National Park 
Augrabies 
Falls National 
Park 
Pilanesberg 
National Park 
Revenue-maximising 
fee 
R 1 131.94 575.67 722.95 634.11 
US$ 144.20 73.33 92.10 80.78 
US$ 
2016 values 
72.98 38.38 48.20 42.27 
2011 conservation fee R 180.00 180.00 100.00 45.00 
US$ 22.93 22.93 12.74 5.73 
US$ 
2016 values 
12.00 12.00 6.67 3.00 
2016 (current-day) 
conservation fee 
R 
2016 values 
280.00 280.00 160.00 65.00 
US$ 
2016 values 
18.05 18.05 10.32 4.19 
Source: Field survey (2011) and own computation 
